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Two Decades of Death:
Trashing the Rule of Law in Virginia
William S. Geimer*
L Introduction: Rule of Law?
In the late unlamented impeachment proceedings, politicians of both
parties piously intoned ad nauseum about the "rule of law." If these leaders
actually have concerns about threats to the rule of law, they should learn
something about the administration of the death penalty. That political
exercise, masquerading as a legal process, is a disgrace to the rule of law.
Nowhere is that more plainly apparent than in the Commonwealth of
Virginia.
To one who has pride in being a member of the legal profession the
best definition of "rule of law" is a non-violent check on the coercive power
of the state. When the government has the physical or technological capa-
bility to do something; and when there is popular support for doing it but
it is not done because the law forbids the action, the rule of law is operating
in its greatest magnificence. When we say, "we are a government of laws,
not men," that is what we mean. It is the most despised and isolated among
us who have the greatest need of the protection of the rule of law. It is
when those in power, who have little immediate need for its protection,
accept the restraints imposed by the rule of law that they distinguish them-
selves and their community. The importance of the rule of law is in large
measure the reason the legal profession is an honorable profession.
It is members of this honorable profession who should be most con-
cerned about the utter disregard for the rule of law that characterizes the
administration of the death penalty in Virginia. Lawyers who will never
see a criminal case should be gravely concerned. They should be concerned
because the same judges and courtrooms they call upon for the resolution
of their disputes are used in a killing selection system that mocks the rule of
law, thereby cheapening their justice system as well. They should be
concerned because the indifference and conscious rejection of the rule of law
that characterizes death penalty law is a poison that can spread.
* Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law; Director, Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse, 1988-1999.
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There are numerous reasons for my disgust with state killing. It is
perfectly understandable that many of these reasons would not be shared by
all members of the legal profession. A diversity in religious faiths and
personal moral codes, for example, is perfectly natural and acceptable in our
profession. But no lawyer committed to the rule of law can support the
death penalty as it is currently administered: in the Commonwealth of
Virginia. The current situation should be particularly painful for teachers
of the law. It is for me. When we teach rules and exceptions and doctrines
and procedures, are we not implicitly communicating to students that these
things are supposed to be real operating constraints upon human behavior?
How should we go about explaining to them that in certain areas this is all
a lie-that the rules, exceptions and doctrines do not operate and the govern-
ment is free to do what it wishes to those it has chosen to disfavor?
I am convinced that this blot on our profession is broadly sustained by
ignorance and indifference rather than malevolence. Justice Marshall was
surely correct that the more people learn about how their actual, not hypo-
thetical, death penalty operates the less they will like it. That has certainly
proved to be the case at the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse. In our
selection process, we do not consider or even inquire about the views of a
prospective student member on "the death penalty." Those views, formed
in any event in ignorance of Virginia reality, are irrelevant. Our mission is
to help make the Sixth Amendment right to counsel mean something and
to provide a unique approach to legal education. Nevertheless, for many
students the wisdom of Justice Marshall becomes increasingly apparent as
they work in the program. Some graduate still ambivalent about the larger
philosophical issues. But the ugly reality of Virginia's system has no defend-
ers.
Deciding how to illustrate this reality in a brief essay has not been
easy. That is because the damage to the rule of law in Virginia takes so
many forms, and the examples are exceedingly numerous.' Finally, I de-
1. They include, but are certainly not limited to allowing gross prosecutorial miscon-
duct and refusing to recognize the Sixth Amendment right to minimally effective assistance
of counsel. See, e.g., Bennett v. Angelone, 374 S.E.2d 303 (Va. 1988) (allowing prosecutor's
closing argument which misquoted bible and compared accused to terrorist Muslim sect);
Gray v. Commonwealth, 356 S.E.2d 157 (Va. 1987); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996)
(allowing prosecutor to lie or mislead the defense about penalty trial evidence he will
present). This reality is particularly distressing. Defense attorneys are denied adequate
resources, including time. See Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 1998) (allowing
Commonwealth to force defense counsel to trial in four months); Matthew K. Mahoney,
Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 95 (1998) (analyzing Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331 (4th Cir.
1998). Although defense counsel have abandoned their clients, Clozza v. Murray, 913 F.2d.
1092 (4th Cir. 1990), and done nothing to defend them, Wise v. Commonwealth, 337 S.E.2d
715 (Va. 1985), the Supreme Court of Virginia has yet to sustain an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim in a capital state habeas, and it has been twelve years since the Fourth Circuit
granted relief on this ground. See Hyman v. Aiken, 824 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1987).
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cided to focus only on the two courts that routinely disregard the rule of
law. I further decided to discuss only two areas where the rule of law is
damaged, and to illustrate only with cases that are contained in this issue of
the Capital DefenseJournal. If a case against these two courts can be made
with these limitations, illustrated solely by opinions that happened to be
decided within the dates allowed by our publication schedule, surely it is
only the iceberg's proverbial tip that is being addressed.
The two courts with little or no regard for law are the Supreme Court
of Virginia and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
There is a spectrum of fairness in Virginia trial courts. Many circuit court
judges make real efforts to conduct capital trials fairly. Unfortunately, some
of these decline to recognize that the United States Constitution as inter-
preted by the United States Supreme Court is a writ that runs in the Com-
monwealth. Within that limitation, however, they try to be fair. Some are
scrupulously fair in all respects. Some are little more than assistant prosecu-
tors. Likewise, in spite of the limitations placed on habeas review by
Congress, and earlier by an activist Rehnquist Supreme Court, many federal
district court judges pay attention to law. In 1996, these judges, hardly
known for liberal activism in criminal law, found errors so serious as to
require granting the writ in five Virginia capital cases. The Fourth Circuit
reinstated the death sentences in every one of them.2 The record of the
Supreme Court of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit, however, is one that
goes beyond rubber stamp. These courts create new and innovative ways
to sustain death sentences.
I. Two Ways to Keep the Death Train Moving
This issue of the Capital Defense Journal provides current illustrations
of two issues that impede application 'of the rule of law. The first is the
hyper-technical application of procedural bars. The second is ignorance or
indifference to the limits on the right to execute represented by the require-
ment that aggravating factors be proved.
A. Procedural Bars: Ho Hum
2. Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350 (4th Cir. 1996); Gray v. Netherland, 99 F.3d 158
(4th Cir. 1996); O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 95 F.3d 1214 (4th Cir. 1996); Tuggle v.
Netherland, 79 F.3d 1386 (4th Cir. 1996); Stout v. Netherland, Nos. 95-4008, 95-4007, 1996
WL 496601 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 1996). In 1997 and 1998, the Fourth Circuit reversed grants of
habeas relief from the district courts in four more Virginia capital cases. Pope v. Netherland,
113 F.3d 1364 (4th Cir. 1997); Satcher v. Pruett, 126 F.3d 561 (4th Cir. 1997); Strickler v.
Pruett, Nos. 97-29, 97-30, 1998 WL 391646 (4th Cir. June 17, 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct.
40 (1998); Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, No. 98-8384, 1999
WL 148296 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1999).
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The public can hardly be expected to understand or care about the
doctrines of default and waiver. Many members of our profession also
appear indifferent. This is particularly regrettable because the Virginia
experience is one of courts demonstrating far, far greater concern for proce-
dural regularity than for fundamental constitutional error. People are killed
on technicalities in Virginia. Let me put it this way. Suppose you went to
a police station, reported that you had just witnessed a rape, and asked that
someone investigate to confirm or deny that you were telling the truth and,
if you were, to do something about it. Suppose you called back later to
check on the investigation. You were told that, to preserve order and
maximize the efficient use of police time felony complaints could not be
made in person. Rather, such complaints had to come in by phone or fax.
Consequently, there would be no investigation and no answer to the ques-
tion of whether a rape had occurred. That essentially describes capital
appellate practice before the Supreme Court of Virginia and the Fourth
Circuit.
Yeatts v. Angelone' is a good starting point. At trial and on direct
appeal, Ronald Yeatts assigned error to the trial court's failure to permit the
jury to be informed that if he were sentenced to life in prison he would not
be eligible for parole for thirty years.4 At habeas, he made the same claim.
The problem was, in the first two stages the asserted ground was the Eighth
Amendment right to present mitigating evidence, unencumbered by proce-
dural barriers.' At habeas, the claim of error was grounded in the Four-
teenth Amendment right to confront the state's case for death. Thus, said
the Fourth Circuit, the claim was defaulted. The court also noted, however,
that the Commonwealth's claim of default was itself defaulted. Not until
the claim reached the Fourth Circuit did the Commonwealth claim default.
The court then went on to pave the way for Yeatts's execution. It forgave
the Commonwealth's default, observing that the failure to object in district
court was "unintentional," and that it really believed that it had raised the
issue. Absent was any discussion of whether Yeatts's failure to include both
grounds for the same objection was "unintentional."
This uneven application of the rules of the game was not Yeatts's only
bizarre experience with procedural bars. Under then current Virginia
habeas procedures, Yeatts had sought relief in the circuit court on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. The claim was dismissed without grant-
ing an evidentiary hearing. He appealed the denial of a hearing to the
3. 166 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1999).
4. Yeatts's trial preceded the abolition of parole in Virginia, and the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), which held
that the due process right to rebut the state's case for death includes the right to inform jurors
of parole ineligibility.
5. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
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Supreme Court of Virginia. The court held that to be insufficient to pre-
serve the underlying claim of ineffective assistance and ruled that it was
defaulted. The Fourth Circuit bought this, disagreeing with the federal
magistrate judge and the federal district court.6
The default machinations of the Supreme Court of Virginia were almost
too much for the Fourth Circuit in Sheppard v. Taylor.7 The state court had
defaulted all of Sheppard's specific assignments of error directed at the
application of the "future dangerousness" aggravator in his case because he
failed also to throw in a general objection to the application of the factor as
a whole! Since this was a new twist, the Fourth Circuit felt impelled to
observe that "it appears that a persuasive argument can be made that
Sheppard cannot be deemed to have been apprized of the requirement in
time. . . ."' The court quickly recovered, however, and stated "we need not
address this issue here, though, because we conclude that the four issues
either are procedurally defaulted for other reasons or lack merit.""0 Note
well, however, that the only reason all of Sheppard's future danger claims
were not flatly defaulted by the absurd holding of the Supreme Court of
Virginia is that the requirement was imposed for the first time on Sheppard.
From now on, defense counsel are on notice of the requirement that it is
essential to throw in the general assignment of error.
Sheppard also puts defense counsel on notice of another useless proce-
dural requirement. For the first time at state habeas, Sheppard made the far
from frivolous claim that appellate review in Virginia, including statutorily
mandated proportionality review, is meaningless. Of course, he could not
know that it was meaningless in his own case until the Supreme Court of
Virginia had issued its opinion on direct appeal. Nevertheless, the Fourth
Circuit upheld the Supreme Court of Virginia's finding that the claim was
defaulted because it was not raised on direct appeal. Where does that leave
counsel? It would appear that facial challenges to Virginia's proportionality
and appellate review must be made at trial and preserved through direct
appeal. Further, these deficiencies, when revealed in a particular case, must
be also be preserved at the direct appeal stage. The only way to do that is
by a petition for rehearing. Thus, a procedural device once thought not to
be intended for routine use in every case is now an indispensable step in
avoiding default. I trust all of this is very clear.
6. The court went on to reject the merits of the claim in spite of having found it be
defaulted. The court often takes this action and the reason is a mystery. Of course, it has
never concluded that a defaulted claim was meritorious.
7. Sheppard v. Taylor, No. 98-12, 1998 WL 743663 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 1998).
8. Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 131 (Va. 1995).
9. Sheppard, 1998 WL 743663, at *4.
10. Id.
11. For a rather plain indicator that these claims have merit, see discussion of Payne v.
Commonwealth, 509 S.E.2d 293 (Va. 1999), infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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The issue of preserving systemic challenges to Virginia's death penalty
would not be complete without noting another default trap designed to keep
those challenges bottled up. In Swisher v. Commonwealth2 and Hedrick v.
Commonwealth,3 the court continued its practice, announced in 1992 in
Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 4 of not permitting a claim to be preserved by
reference to trial documents. Consider how clever this scheme really is.
Many of these claims have been repeatedly rejected and the only purpose of
including them is to preserve the record."5 In order to be preserved, they
must not only be raised at trial at the appropriate time and manner, but also
assigned as error and briefed. Failure at any one of these stages means
default of the claim. Appellant's brief, absent permission of the court, is
limited to fifty pages.'6 Counsel wishing to preserve what in state court will
surely be "losers" must sacrifice space that would otherwise be devoted to
her best issues. 17 Is there any legitimate reason for this requirement? No.
Part of the appellate process is designation of the record on appeal. It is
common and accepted in capital cases to designate the entire record. Thus,
the bench brief whose argument counsel simply wishes to adopt by refer-
ence is before the court on appeal. The court simply refuses to look at it.
These cases only begin to describe the cozy cooperation of these two
courts in elevating procedural regularity over justice. But I promised to rely
only on opinions summarized in this issue of the Capital Defense Journal.
B. All Aggravators All the Time
In addition to proof of a premeditated murder and a predicate offense
or event, the law renders the accused ineligible for a sentence of death unless
the Commonwealth can prove one of two aggravating factors beyond a
reasonable doubt. The statutory language of these factors, commonly
referred to as "future dangerousness" and "vileness," contains a great deal of
verbiage.'" In practice, however, the essence is "fear" and "loathing." The
12. Swisher v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 763 (Va. 1998).
13. Hedrick v. Commonwealth, Nos. 982055, 982056, 1999 WL 101079 (Va. Feb. 26,
1999).
14. Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 131 (Va. 1997).
15. In spite of the court's advice to the contrary, consider Kasi v. Commonwealth, 508
S.E.2d 57 (Va. 1998), winnowing out weaker claims on appeal in capital cases is foolhardy.
The claim that juries had to be apprized of parole ineligibility, for example, had been rejected
by the Supreme Court of Virginia numerous times before the United States Supreme Court
upheld it in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
16. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:26(a).
17. For our advice on combating this scam, see Alix M. Karl, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF.
J. 463 (analyzing Swisher v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 763, 765 (Va. 1998)); Kelly E. P.
Bennett, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 429 (analyzing Hedrick v. Commonwealth, Nos.
982055, 982056, 1999 WL 101079 (Va. Feb. 26, 1999)).
18. The Virginia Code provides the following:
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vileness factor in particular is treated exactly like the famous Untied States
Supreme Court quote about obscenity: "I can't define it, but I know it when
I see it." That might be satisfactory. After all, why not just tell the citizen
jurors that death sentences are to be reserved for "really bad" murders. If
that is not sufficient guidance, they might be instructed also that the state of.
their stomachs after viewing autopsy and crime scene photos is a further
guide. This scenario essentially describes current Virginia practice, except
that those two explicit instructions are not actually given only implied.
Unfortunately, the rule of law is supposed to have something to say
about this. When the United States SuFreme Court permitted the death
penalty to resume for some murderers, to the dismay of many of us, it
flatly prohibited death sentences for all of them.20 A decade later, it reiter-
ated that there are no circumstances of a homicide for which the legislature
can create a mandatory death penalty.2 ' So, supposedly, the legal systems
of the states that wished to execute were required to find a way to choose
among murderers, identifying the "worst" for the ultimate penalty. One of
the approved procedures for this sorting process involved guiding the
sentencer's discretion with "aggravating factors" that demonstrated an
increased level of personal culpability in the slayer. In turn, one of the
factors approved was Georgia's "vileness" factor. Virginia adopted this
factor verbatim.
In 1980, and after, the Court set out further restrictions on the applica-
tion of this vague factor. The Supreme Court of Virginia has consistently
ignored and evaded those restrictions, tailoring its opinions to do whatever
is necessary to shoehorn the trial events into a satisfactory application of the
factors.22 Approaching 140 opinions on direct appeal of death sentences, the
court has yet to find a single flaw in the application of either aggravating
factor. To read those opinions one would have to conclude that our trial
In assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an offense for which the death
penalty may be imposed, a senennce of death shall not be mposed unless the
court or iury shall (1) after consideration of the past criminal record of convic-ti ns of the defendant, find that there is a probability that the defendant wouldcommit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society or that his conduct in committing the offense for which he
stands charged was outrageously or wantonly vile, hiorrible or inhuman in that
it involved torture, depravity of mnd or an aggravated battery to the victim; and(2) recommend that the penalty for eath be impos .
VA. CODE ANN. ] 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1995).19. Greggv. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976);Proffittv. Florida, 428 U.s . 242 (1976);Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).20. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.s. 280 (1976).
21. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
22. In keeping with the promise of this essay, the machinations of the Supreme Courtof Virginia to preserve findings of future dangerousness" will not be discussed here. Theyare not as well illustrated by the opinions in this issue as is the manipulation of the "vileness"
factor. They are, however, every bit as egregious.
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courts and juries are performing the difficult task of identifying the "worst"
murderers pefectly. It is not only the gravestones of the mentally retarded,
the mentally ill, and juveniles that give lie to that impression. It is the
opinions themselves. They are transparently post-hoc justifications.
What is this law that the court consistently ignores or evades? Here is
a brief outline. In Godfrey v. Georgia,23 the United States Supreme Court
held that the vague statutory language of the vileness factor was insufficient
to guide sentencers in choosing among murderers. The Court went on to
require that some further "narrowing construction" of the vague terms be
either given to the sentencer, or applied by the appellate court. Later, the
Court made it clear that not all attempts at clarifying the statutory language
would satisfy the Constitution,24 and that appellate courts were likewise
forbidden to simply look at an "ugly" set of facts and pronounce the killing
vile.2"
How has Virginia reacted to the purportedly serious legal constraints
upon this visceral exercise in discretion guiding? First, it has never over-
ruled or otherwise acknowledged error in its pre-Godfrey holding that the
statutory language was just fine, containing terms with commonly under-
stood meanings."' In the wake of Godfrey, however, someone must have
gotten a little nervous. References began to appear to further meanings of
two of the three components of the factor: torture, depravity of mind, and
aggravated battery. In Smith v. Commonwealth,27 its initial post-reinstate-
ment opinion validating the Virginia scheme, the Supreme Court of Virginia
"defined" the latter two. Depravity of mind was said to be "a degree of
moral turpitude and psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in the
definition of ordinary legal malice and premeditation." Aggravated battery
had been said to be a battery that was "qualitatively and quantitatively...
more culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of mur-
der."29 Torture was not defined in Smith and has not been since defined.
Remembering that the object of this exercise is to identify killers with an
enhanced degree of individual culpability, where are we? There is no
torture definition. The depravity of mind definition is obviously as useless
as the statutory language itself. Aggravated battery, however, might be
sufficient if the court knew or cared enough to interpret and apply it as the
23. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
24. Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990).
25. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1998) (explicitly rejecting the argument
that "a particular set of facts surrounding a murder, however shocking they might be, [are]
enough in themselves, and without some narrowing principle to apply to those facts, to
warrant the imposition of the death penalty").
26. Clark v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 784 (Va. 1979).
27. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1978).
28. Id. at 149.
29. Id
[Vol. 11:2
TWO DECADES OF DEATH
United States Supreme Court has required-that is, by focusing on both
qualitative and quantitative culpability. Until the cases summarized in this
issue, however, the court has managed to uphold all findings of vileness
simply by a quantitative assessment of the number of shots or stab wounds.
Two or more of either have sufficed to define conduct that "outrageously
vile, horrible, or inhumane ......
The court, of course, has never formally admitted its mechanical
wound-counting exercise. Its ignorance or indifference to the purpose of the
aggravator, however, was revealed in the recent case of Reid v. Common-
wealth,30 summarized in this issue.31 There, discussing aggravated battery,
the court denied the need for any enhanced degree of culpable mental state
to support a finding that one's conduct in committing the offense was
outrageously vile, etc. Although there was uncontradicted evidence that
Reid had perhaps not even the mental state required for the offense of
capital murder, he inflicted a number of wounds and that was good enough
to keep him on death row. In Hedrick v. Commonwealth," however, the
court ran into a minor problem. The victim died instantly from a single
gunshot wound. Unfazed, the court decided for the first time to discuss
aggravated battery in terms of qualitative culpability. It did so by opening
the time frame that described "defendant's conduct in committing the
offense," moving it back to assaults and indignities inflicted upon the victim
even before the intent to kill had been formed. In Hedrick, the victim was
shot once in the face with a shotgun." From the discussion by the court of
how this came about, it appears to have been important to the court, though
the choice an imprecise weapon that leaves a gory crime scene was deemed
"constitutionally irrelevant" by the Godfrey court. 3" Finally, the court's
lame attempt to distinguish Godfrey even reported erroneously that
Godfrey's weapon was a rifle.3 ' The court also concluded, gratuitously and
without discussion or explanation, Hedrick also "tortured" the victim.36
Apparently weary of all this jurisprudential exercise, the court in
Cherrix v. Commonwealth7 simply selected a few pieces of evidence and
30. 506 S.E.2d 787 (Va. 1998).
31. Matthew K. Mahoney, Case Note, 11 Cap. Def. J. 457 (1999) (analyzing Reid v.
Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 787 (Va. 1998)).
32. Hedrick v. Commonwealth, Nos. 982055, 982056, 1999 WL 101079 (Va. Feb. 26,
1999).
33. This, of course, meant highly inflammatory photographs of the victim's face, one
of which was enlarged, were shown to the jury. Hedrick's appellate claim on this issue was,
of course, summarily rejected with boilerplate language. Id., at *6.
34. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 435 (1980).
35. Hedrick, 1999 WL 101079, at * 7.
36. Id.




declared in a conclusory fashion that they established both torture and
depravity of mind. Cherrix's act of sodomy on the victim and his statement
that she looked "beautiful" at the funeral home equaled depravity of mind.
The sodomy at gunpoint while she begged for life constituted torture."
The court's selective use of evidence for post-boc approval of vileness
findings in Hedrick and Cberrix furthers another injustice in Virginia.
Notice and meaningful opportunity to defend are the foundations of due
process. By requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of one of the
aggravating factors, Virginia's capital scheme makes them every bit as much
elements of the Commonwealth's case for death as are the elements of the
offense of capital murder. Hedrick tried and failed to learn what the factor
meant and to have the Commonwealth identify what evidence it considered
relevant. The Supreme Court of Virginia in Hedrick, as well as in Swisher
v. Commonwealth,39 rebuffed this attempt to gain fundamental fairness as it
has done in every other case. The court either mischaracterized the claim,
as it did in Swisher, or says that the capital murder indictment tells the
accused everything he needs to know. The indictment, of course, says
absolutely nothing about the aggravating factors. To their credit, many trial
judges order responses on this issue. When they do not, the Supreme Court
of Virginia permits people to go to their deaths after a trial by ambush.
They do not learn until after that trial what evidence was important to their
demise.
Cherrix is an example. Remembering that the exercise is identifying a
degree of enhanced culpability among murders so as to make eligible for
death consideration, there are a few things Cherrix might like to have
known before publication of the opinion sustaining his death sentence. In
addition to knowing that the sodomy necessary to his guilt of capital mur-
der was going to be double counted as part of both depravity of mind and
torture, he might have wanted to deny or explain the statement about the
victim at the funeral home. Would even the most able defense attorney
reading a client's alleged confession to police figure out that it was critically
important to address that part of it at trial? Virginia practice on vileness is
this: The prosecutor enlarges the color photos of the mangled victim. The
jury finds "vileness." The Supreme Court of Virginia does what it
takes-summary rejection, mischaracterization of claims, manipulation of
evidence, indifference to federal law-to sustain the finding. This is the rule
of law in action? How does one go about teaching Godfrey v. Georgia to
students in their first semester of law school? With fingers crossed behind
38. Id., at *13.
39. Swisher v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 763 (Va. 1998). See also Alix M. Karl, Case
Note, 11 CAP. DEF.J. 463 (1998) (analyzing Swisher v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 763 (Va.
1998)).
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back? With an introductory statement that this law does not apply in some
jurisdictions?
III. A Third Issue
Like the Supreme Court of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit, I have
been less than candid in my writing. I am going to close by briefly mention-
ing a third issue illustrating the disregard for the rule of law that has helped
Virginia attain infamy as the second most prolific killer state in the modern
era. A statute mandates that the Supreme Court of Virginia conduct a
proportionality review of every death sentence, whether there is an appeal
or not." Part of that review is to ensure that a death sentence has not been
imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice. This mandate is, of
course, meaningless to the court. It has never set aside a death sentence on
this basis. As emotional as one would think life and death trials might be,
that is apparently not the case in Virginia. Everything is calm, rational and
fair.
Also analyzed in this issue is the case of Payne v. Commonwealth.4'
Eric Payne was convicted and sentenced by a jury. He refused direct appeal
so his case was before the Supreme Court of Virginia only for proportional-
ity review. To Payne's complaint that the prosecutor had waved the bloody
photographs of the victim in front of the jury while referring to Payne as
a "monster" and a "predator," the court responded that this was fair com-
ment on properly admitted evidence.42 In the context of inflammatory
arguments law, this was perhaps not surprising." Payne's related claim
about the trial judge and the court's response, however, is nothing short of
40. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313 (Michie 1998).
41. Id
42. Id
43. In Bennett v.A ngelone, 92 F.3d 1336,1345 (4th Cir. 1996), the defendant argued that
the Commonwealth's "religiously-loaded" arguments during the penalty phase were "inflam-
matory, irrelevant, and grossly prejudicial" in violation of his due process rights. The
following statements were made by the Commonwealth's attorney:
Some will say that society shouldn't take a life because that's murder also.
That's not true. Vengeance is mine saith the Lord, but later when he covered the
Earth with water ancdonly left Noah and his family and some animals to survive
when he saw the damage what [sic] had been done to the Earth, God said "I'll
never do that again" ani handed that sword of justice to Noah.
Noah is now the Government. Noah will make the decision who dies.
"Thou shall [sic] not kill" is a prescription [sic] against an individual; it is not
against Government. Because Government has a duty to protect its citizens.
Id. at 1346. Despite its finding the prosecutor's comments to be "objectionable and unwar-
ranted," the court of appeals went on to hold that because of the powerful evidence of the
defendant's guilt and the "[w]hat the lawyers say is not evidence" jury instruction given, "it
was not sufficiently egregious to render Bennett's trial fundamentally unfair." Id.
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amazing. Payne complained that the aforementioned argument of the
prosecutor must have had the desired effect on the judge because:
[T]he court described him as a mad dog who should be put in a gunny
sack with some bricks and dropped of a bridge. Payne opines that this
is ample evidence that the sentence of death was imposed under the
influence of passion and prejudice. We do not agree. When all of the trial
court's remarks are read, it is a pparent that, before imposing the death
sentences, the court considered not only Payne's criminal history, but
also his evidence in mitigation.4
I am confident that the Virginia General Assembly cares very little that
a mockery is made of its statutory mandate. The statute was passed at a
time when it was thought to be constitutionally essential.4" A tiny portion
of the funds wasted on capital trials might be recouped by repealing it.
IV Conclusion
In 1998, after a valid claim about the racial makeup of his venire had
been misstated by both the Supreme Court of Virginia and the Fourth
Circuit in order to facilitate its rejection, Ronald Watkins was put to death.
Treatment of his jury claim was not the only violation of the rule of law
that contributed to this result. At the time of his death, Ron was a re-
deemed, decent person who had become like a son to me. Shortly after he
was killed, I spoke to a journalist and characterized the Supreme Court of
Virginia as "mediocre." For that remark I have been criticized, perhaps
justly. There is no doubt that at the time I made it, I was grieving for my
friend. I grieve yet. I will tell you, however, that after another year of
reviewing the state of what passes for law in Virginia, I think my character-
ization of the court was too generous. Apart from my involvement at a
personal level, however, there is still the matter of the law. Even if I had
never met Ronald Watkins; even if I was not so proud to be the first mem-
ber of my family to become a lawyer; even if I were not a Christian; even
if I did not view the legal profession as an honorable profession; even if I did
not have such a degree of reverence for the rule of law as a constraint on
raw power; even if I were a civil lawyer doing insurance defense, I would be
ashamed and appalled. The sloppiness and downright injustice that is death
penalty "law" in Virginia today would not be tolerated and is not tolerated
where mere property is at stake. The rule of law can be rescued only if
those who teach and practice outside the criminal justice field come to care
44. Payne, 509 S.E.2d at 299.
45. To the surprise of many, and after Virginia had patterned its modern statute on
those approved in 1976 in Georgia and Texas, the United States Supreme Court held in Pulley
v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984), that proportionality review is not essential. Meaningful
appellate review, and the arbitrary application of state created rights, however, remain as
Fourteenth Amendment issues.
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enough about it. If they do, the death penalty may continue for awhile, but
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